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Abstract. Security is one of the main challenges that developers of information 
systems face. However, current methodologies for information system 
development do not provide enough evidence of integrating successfully 
security concerns throughout the whole range of the development process. In 
this paper, we provide an approach towards the solution of two of the problems 
associated with the integration of security. Moreover, we describe how our 
approach can be integrated within the Tropos methodology and we illustrate it 
with the aid of a real-life example. 
1 Introduction 
One of the many challenges that developers face during the development of 
modern Information Systems (IS) is the security of the systems. Security Engineering 
of information systems is mainly concerned with methods providing cost effective 
and operationally effective protection of information systems from undesirable events 
[1], and as Anderson claims [2], security engineering is about building systems to 
remain dependable in the face of malice, error or mischance. Therefore, to effectively 
design a secure system it is important to know what the potential threats are, so that 
appropriate counter-measures can be taken.  
However, no matter how good the protection is, possible attackers will (and have 
up to now) find possible vulnerabilities to expose the system. In addition, during the 
analysis and design developers, most of the time, assume the infrastructure is 100% 
trustworthy. However this might not be the case, making the prediction of every 
possible attack during the development of the system very difficult, and allowing a 
potential attacker to attack the system with types of attack that the developer cannot 
identify or foresee during the development of the system. On the other hand, a well-
known axiom of computer security states that the only completely secure computer 
system is the one that has never been turned on.  
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Therefore, usually, the goal when developing an information system is to provide 
as much security as possible trading sometimes security requirements with other 
functional and non-functional requirements. 
Although a methodology that provides solutions to all of the problems [3, 4, 5] that 
the integration of security in the development process can introduce, has not been 
developed, recently researchers have started to address some of these issues. 
McDermott and Fox adapt use cases [3] to capture and analyse security requirements, 
whereas Sindre and Opdahl [6] define the concept of a misuse case, the inverse of a 
use case, which describes a function that the system should not allow. In addition, a 
number of proposals [7, 8] that extend UML to cope with security have been 
proposed. In previous work [10, 11], we have proposed a structured process that 
integrates security and systems engineering, and it uses the same concepts and 
notations throughout the development of an information system, and we have 
integrated this process within the development stages of the Tropos methodology.    
In this paper we extend our structured security process [10, 11] to provide solutions 
towards two important problems: the involvement of novice security developers in the 
development of information systems that usually require knowledge of security, and 
the difficulty of fully testing a proposed security solution at the design stage. In 
particular, we introduce the security reference diagram1 and the security attack 
scenarios. To demonstrate their applicability we use as an example the electronic 
single assessment process system case study and we explain how the proposed 
solutions can be integrated into the Tropos security process.  
Section 2 of the paper introduces the case study that will be used throughout the 
paper to illustrate the proposed approach, and Section 3 introduces the security 
reference diagram. Section 4 describes the Security Attack Scenarios and Section 5 
concludes the paper and it provides some directions for future work. 
2 The Case Study 
In this section, we present the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system 
case study, first introduced [17] by one of the authors, which we will use throughout 
this paper to illustrate our approach.  
The eSAP case study involves the development of a health and social care 
information system for the effective care of older people in England [17].  Security is 
a very important factor in the development of the electronic Single Assessment 
Process, since security of personal health information is considered priority by many 
health care unions in different countries of the world including England. The privacy 
of health and social care information, such as the health and social care plans used in 
the electronic single assessment process, is the number one security concern when 
developing the system.  
                                                          
1
 Although we have introduced the term in previous papers [10, 11], this is the first paper that 
the security reference diagram is explicitly described and it is integrated within the 
development process 
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Other important concerns are integrity and availability. Integrity assures that 
information is not corrupted and availability ensures the information is always 
available to authorised health and social care professionals.  
3 Security Reference Diagram 
Tropos [12] is a software development methodology that employs modelling 
concepts such as actors, goals, soft goals, tasks, resources and intentional 
dependencies. These concepts are suited to model security requirements, since these 
(security requirements) are usually expressed in natural language using notions such 
as agents and high level goals such as confidentiality and authentication [9]. 
In previous work [10, 11], we have introduced extra concepts to the Tropos 
methodology and we have also redefined existing concepts with security in mind, to 
enable Tropos to model security requirements during the software development 
process. However, the identification of security requirements in the very early phase 
of the software development is still a problematic activity. In order to help developer 
in this activity we introduce the security reference diagram.  
The security reference diagram represents the relationships between security 
features, threats, protection objectives, and security mechanisms and its main purpose 
is to provide security novices with a valuable reference point when considering 
security issues during the development of information systems.  
Security features represent features associated to security that the system-to-be 
must have. In this work the concept of a soft-goal is used to capture security features 
on the security reference diagram because security features are not subject to any 
clear criteria for satisfaction. Examples of security features are privacy, availability, 
and integrity. Protection objectives represent a set of principles or rules that 
contribute towards the achievement of the security features. In this work, protection 
objectives are modelled using the concept of a goal, because a protection objective 
represents desired security states that the system must have. Examples of protection 
objectives are authorisation, cryptography and accountability. Security mechanisms 
represent standard security methods for helping towards the satisfaction of the 
protection objectives. The concept of a task is used to model security mechanisms 
because a security mechanism represents a particular way of satisfying a protection 
objective. It must be noticed that furthered analysis of some security mechanisms is 
required to allow developers to identify possible security sub-mechanisms. Threats 
represent circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or problems that can 
endanger the security features of the system. Since Tropos notation does not provide 
any related concept to model threats, a new notation has been introduced. Examples 
of threats are social engineering, password sniffing and eavesdropping attacks. The 
notation of these concepts is illustrated in Figure 1. The above-mentioned nodes of a 
security reference diagram are associated with the aid of two types of links (similar to 
the contribution links that can be found in the Tropos methodology): positive and 
negative contribution links. A positive contribution link associates two nodes when 
one node helps in the fulfilment of the other. Consider, for instance, a protection 
objective that contributes positively to the satisfaction of a security feature. A 
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negative contribution link, on the other hand, indicates that a node contributes 
towards the denial of another node. Graphically, a positive contribution link is 
modelled as an arrow, which points towards the node that is satisfied, with a plus (+) 
whereas a negative contribution link is represented as an arrow with a minus (-) (see 
Figure 2 as an example). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Notation used in the security reference diagram 
The process of constructing the security reference diagram is non-deterministic due 
to the choice of a particular rule, at each step. To control this kind of non-determinism 
during the construction of the security reference diagram, priority rules have been 
assigned. These rules, introduced in [16], are presented below in priority sequence: 
R1. Introduce the security feature to the diagram, R2. Introduce the security threats 
and associate them with the security features, R3. Introduce the protection objectives 
and associate them with the security features, R4. Introduce the security mechanisms 
and associate them with the protection objectives, R5. Decompose the security 
mechanisms to security sub-mechanisms.  
Consider for instance, the construction of the security diagram for the eSAP 
system. As identified in Section 2, the main security features of the system are 
privacy, integrity and availability as shown in the security reference diagram in 
Figure 2. As shown in the diagram, each of those security features receives (according 
to the second rule (R.2)) some negative contributions from different security threats. 
For example, social engineering is a major threat to the system. This involves a 
private detective (or someone interested in obtaining personal health information) that 
calls in the health professional’s office, introduces himself as a doctor in an 
emergency or acute hospital and asks information about the medical record of a 
particular patient [2].   
Furthermore, the size of the electronic single assessment process system and the 
large number of health and social care professionals that might be involved introduces 
the problem of data aggregation and increases the risk of social engineering or 
unauthorised access. Apart from the threats to the privacy of the data, there are threats 
to the integrity and the availability of it. For instance, malicious attackers might 
change the content of medical care plans, or a number of compromised systems attack 
a single target. This initially results in denial of service to the users of the targeted 
system, and later in the shut down of the system, therefore making the system 
unavailable. On the other hand, the security features receive (according to the third 
rule (R.3)) some positive contributions from different protection objectives. For 
instance, Privacy receives positive contributions from Authorisation and 
Cryptography. In turn, each of these protection objectives receives some positive 
contributions (according to the fourth rule (R.4)) from different security mechanisms. 
For example, the Authorisation protection objective receives positive contributions 
from the Access Control, Authentication and Information Flow security mechanisms. 
Moreover, these security mechanisms can be decomposed (according to the fifth rule 
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(R.5)) to sub-mechanisms. For instance, the Authentication security mechanism is 
decomposed to Passwords, Digital Signatures and Biometrics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. An example of a security reference diagram 
  
As presented in [10, 11], during the rest of the early requirements analysis, the late 
requirements analysis and the architectural design, the actors of the eSAP system 
along with their secure capabilities and the interactions between them are identified. 
As a result of this analysis [16], the eSAP actor is decomposed, amongst others, to the 
following actors: Skills Manager, Assessment Evaluator, Integrity Verification 
Manager, Professional DB Manager, Authenticator, Actions Manager, Auditing 
Manager, Access Controler, and eSAP guard.  
Having identified the actors of the system, the next step (during the architectural 
design phase) involves the application of the Security Attack Scenarios to allow 
developers to test the security of the developed system against possible security 
attacks. 
4 Security Attack Scenarios 
Testing is widely considered an important activity that helps to identify errors in a 
system and techniques such as control and data flow testing, formal specifications, 
special testing languages, and test tools have been used for many years, in testing 
systems, and they are considered valuable solutions for many projects. However, most 
of these approaches are difficult to apply, they require special training and skills, and 
they employ their own concepts and notations [13]. As a result, the applicability of 
those approaches conflict with some of the requirements [16] which a security-
oriented approach should demonstrate. Therefore, a technique, which is based on the 
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use of scenarios has been developed and integrated within the Tropos security-
oriented process to enable developers to test the system under development.  
A Security Attack Scenario (SAS) is represented as enhanced Tropos diagrams and 
is used to test how the system copes in different kinds of security attacks. A Security 
Attack Scenario involves a possible attacker, possible attack(s), the resources that are 
attacked, and the actors of the system related to the attack together with their secure 
capabilities. An attacker is depicted as an actor who aims to break the security of the 
system. The attacker intentions are modelled as goals and tasks and their analysis 
follows the same reasoning techniques that the Tropos methodology employs for goal 
and task analysis. Attacks are depicted as dash-lined links (called attack links) that 
contain an “attacks” tag, starting from one of the attackers goals and ending to the 
attacked resource (see for example Figure 3).  
The process is divided into three main stages: creation of the scenario, validation of 
the scenario, and testing and redefinition of the system according to the scenario. 
There are two basic steps in the creation of a scenario. The first step involves the 
identification of the attackers’ intentions and the possible attacks to the system and 
the second step involves identification of possible countermeasures of the system to 
the indicated attacks.  
During the first step, Tropos goal diagram notation is used for analysing the 
intentions of an attacker in terms of goals and tasks. Some of these goals can be 
identified by the threats modelled on the security reference diagram. For example, the 
threat “social engineering” can introduce a goal “perform social engineering” to a 
potential attacker. However, other goals (apart from the ones introduced by the threats 
identified in the security reference diagram) could be derived from the analysis of a 
possible attacker’s intentions. When the analysis of the attacker’s intentions has been 
completed, possible attacks to the resources of the system are indicated using attack 
links.  
The next step in the creation of a security attack scenario involves the 
identification of the actors of the system that possess capabilities to prevent the 
identified, from the previous step, attacks.  Therefore, the actors of the system related 
to the identified attack(s) are modelled. The secure capabilities, of each actor, that 
help to prevent the identified attacks are identified and dashed-links (with the tag 
“help”) are provided indicating the capability and the attack they help to prevent.  
When the scenarios have been created, they must be validated. Therefore, the next 
stage of the process involves the validation of the scenario. Software inspections are 
proved as an effective means for document-based validation [15] and as such are the 
choice of this research for the validation of the security attack scenarios. The 
inspection of the scenarios involves the identification of any possible violations of the 
Tropos syntax and of any possible inconsistency between the scenarios and the 
models of the previous stages. Such an inspection involves the use of validation 
checklists.  
When the scenarios have been validated, the next step aims to identify test cases 
and test, using those test cases, the security of the system against any potential 
attacks. Each test case is derived from a possible attack depicted in the security attack 
scenarios. For each test case a precondition is necessary (the state of the system 
before the attack), an expected system reaction (how the system reacts in the attack), 
and also a discussion that forms the basis for the decision regarding the test case.  
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The test cases are applied and a decision is formed to whether the system can 
prevent the identified attacks or not. The decision whether an attack can be prevented 
(and in what degree) or not lies on the developer. However as an indication of the 
decision it must be taken into consideration that at least one secure capability must 
help an attack, in order for the developer to decide the attack can be prevented. 
Attacks that cannot be prevented are notated as solid attack links (as opposed to 
dashed attack links). For each attack that it has been decided it cannot be prevented, 
extra capabilities must be assigned to the system to help towards the prevention of 
that attack  
To better understand the process, consider the eSAP case study. As it can been 
seen from the security reference diagram, three are the main security features required 
by the eSAP system: privacy, integrity and availability. Different categories of attacks 
can be identified [18] that can endanger these security features.  
Due to lack of space, in this paper we only present a security attack scenario 
related to a modification attack [18]. The modification scenario involves an Attacker 
that wishes to attack the integrity of the eSAP system. As identified in the analysis of 
the security reference diagram, three main threats are involved in this kind of attack, 
cryptographic attacks, care plan changing and viruses.  
Therefore, the Attacker’s main goal, attack eSAP integrity, can be decomposed to 
modify content of messages, change values in data files, and alter programs to 
perform differently (Figure 3). The first sub-goal involves the Attacker trying to 
modify the content of any messages transmitted over the network. To fulfil this goal, 
the Attacker might try to employ cryptographic attacks to any resource transmitted 
between any external actors and the eSAP system. The second sub-goal indicates the 
Attacker trying to change the values in data files of the system. The fulfilment of this 
goal can be satisfied by means of changing the data of resources stored in the eSAP 
system. The third sub-goal indicates the attempt of the Attacker to alter a program so 
it performs differently. Mainly this can be achieved using viruses that can alter the 
behaviour of specific programs in order to enable the attacker to gain access to the 
system or to system’s information. 
As an example, consider the scenario in which a Social Worker wishes to obtain an 
assessment evaluation [16]. Three main test cases are identified, cryptographic 
attacks, data changing attacks and viruses attacks. Due to lack of space, only the 
viruses attack test case is shown in figure 4.  
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Fig. 3. Modification Attack Scenario 
Test Case 3: Viruses 
Precondition: The Attacker tries to change the system behaviour by using some kind 
of virus. 
System expected security reaction: The system should be able to prevent viruses. 
Discussion: Viruses consist one of the most sophisticated threats to computer 
systems. It is quite common for attackers to send viruses to computer systems they 
want to attack in order to exploit vulnerabilities and change the behaviour of the 
system. Although many effective countermeasures have been developed for existing 
types of viruses, many new types of viruses are also developed frequently.  
An ideal measurement against viruses is prevention. In other words, viruses should 
not get into the system. However, this is almost impossible to achieve. Therefore, the 
best approach is to be able to detect, identify and remove a virus. Auditing helps 
towards the detection of the virus. However, apart from this the eSAP system is not 
protected against viruses.  
Test Case Results: The eSAP system needs to be integrated with an anti-virus 
program to enable it to effectively detect, identify and remove any possible viruses. 
Such a program, which could be another internal actor of the eSAP system, should be 
able to monitor the system and take effective measurements against any possible 
viruses. 
Fig. 4. An example of a test case 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
The introduction of the security reference diagram allows the identification of 
desired security requirements very early in the development stages, and helps to 
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propagate them throughout the development stages. This introduces a security-
oriented paradigm to the software engineering process. This and the fact that security 
expert developers can expand the security reference diagram, provides security 
novices with a valuable reference point when considering security issues during the 
development of information systems.  
It is worth mentioning that the security reference diagram is similar to the security 
catalogue first introduced by Yu [19]. The main difference lies in the concepts 
introduced by the security reference diagram and also on its integration within the 
development stage of the Tropos methodology. 
On the other hand, the introduction of security attack scenarios to test the system’s 
response to potential attacks allows developers to test the developed security solution 
during the early development stages. The proposed scenario-based analysis is similar 
to the work presented by Liu et al [20]. However, there are some important 
differences. Liu’s work is basically used to identify security requirements; the 
Security Attack Scenarios in this work are used to test the security requirements of the 
system identified in the previous development stages. So a very similar idea is applied 
in a different stage of the development lifecycle. Liu argues that when the intentions 
of the attackers are identified the system can be equipped with countermeasures, 
however it is never mentioned how this can be done neither provides a kind of process 
for providing such countermeasures. Moreover, in the approach of this research test 
cases are considered. In other words, a way is provided to test each scenario for 
specific test cases, reason about the reaction of the system and take a final decision if 
the system can react to the specific attack. In cases that the system cannot react to the 
attack, possible countermeasures are discussed and secure capabilities are introduced 
to the actors of the system to satisfy them.  
Future work involves the expansion of our approach to consider security related 
concepts such as trust, and ownership and also the development of a tool to assist in 
the development process by, for example, automatically produce some attack 
scenarios and check the system responses. 
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